Suicide attack in Pakistan
Updated
An explosion has struck a bus stop in the garrison city of Rawalpindi, killing eight people. Another seventeen people were injured.
Local reports said a suicide bomber on a motorbike blew himself up, but no one's claimed responsibility. The Interior ministry said the bomber was probably deployed to attack a mass protest march, which had been scheduled in Rawalpindi and Islamabad.
The US special envoy to Pakistan and Afghanistan, Richard Holbrooke may have applauded what he calls the "statesmanlike act" by President Asif Ali Zardari, in defusing what could have been a dangerous confrontation.. but there are others who think the lawyers were reckless in planning the so-called 'Long March'. And, as the latest suicide attack in Rawalpindi showed, Pakistan is under a grave threat. The latest report from the International Crisis Group warns that Pakistan faces what it calls the 'Jihadist Challenge' from extremist groups such as Sunni militants and the Taliban.
Presenter: Sen Lam
Speaker: Kamran Bokhari, director of Middle East Analysis at the Texas-based global intelligence organisation, Stratfor
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BOKHARI: Yes I completely agree and in fact, I would go on to say that the security establishment requires an overhaul if you will, because the fact that the Jihadists are able to strike with near impunity and the government is on the back foot or playing defence, suggests that there is a penetration of the security establishment by the Jihadists. So not just more law enforcement or increased police activity or increased training, but it requires a rethink of the way the security establishment is approaching this problem. As you may recall, the Islamist militant groups that are attacking the government are in fact a creation of the military and intelligence establishment from the past.
LAM: And yet how much influence does a civilian government have on these rogue elements within the military? It must be a very difficult task?
BOKHARI: It is, because the civilian government is just trying to get on its foot, and trying to have a standing of its own in which it can actually say we're taking decisions and get the military to play along. But before that can happen, it had to sort out this legal issue and this political crisis that it was facing from the opposition leader Nawaz Sharif and the legal community demanding the restoration of Iftikhar Mohammad Chaudhury and his allies in the judiciary. So with that behind the government, now is the opportunity for the government to say ok now we need to deal with and work with the military to sort this out. But there's a lot of inertia and resistance from within the system to completely overhaul the way the security establishment has been doing business for nearly 30 years.
LAM: Do you think it might help if they were to refresh the very top of the security establishment that you speak of? What will it take to rid the military of these rogue elements that are lending support to extremists in Punjab and in the FATA (Federally Administered Tribal Areas) region?
BOKHARI: Well the problem at this point is the distinction that is made by the stakeholders in Pakistan, particularly the military between the "bad Taliban" and the "good Taliban". The "good Taliban" being those who are still operating under the influence of the Pakistani military and those who have become rogue or renegade. So there is that distinction which itself is a defeating one because it is one big mess which you can't really sort out and put into these neat categories. Now until that issue or that viewpoint is addressed, I don't expect any major improvement. I mean, there've been reshuffles of people at the top of various institutions, various security agencies but that has not led to any progress.
LAM: So what do you make of US President Barack Obama's plan to negotiate with these milder and perhaps, more moderate elements of the Taliban in neighbouring Afghanistan?
BOKHARI: Well it follows from the US strategy that it employed in Iraq where it saw that a military solution was not possible in the wake of the Sunni insurgency. But there were certain specific unique circumstances in Iraq that allowed the United States to successfully negotiate with the insurgents to the point where those insurgents became allies of the United States in fighting al Qaeda and putting down the Sunni resistance. In contrast, in Afghanistan we don't have those same situations, there's a huge difference. The biggest one being that the Taliban are the main fighting force and they are the torch bearers of Jihadism if you will. And then, the question is, Is the Taliban something that you can negotiate with, mind you it is not a singular organisation with whom you can hold discussions with representatives you can sit down at a table and potentially have negotiations. The Taliban any more is a moniker for a broad movement of various actors that compete with one another and are distributed along the entire geographical stretch, from Afghanistan to Pakistan's north-west.
